Nebraska Law Review
Volume 36 | Issue 4

Article 8

1957

Damages—Loss of Earnings—Measure of
Recovery and Admissibility of Evidence of Prior
Earnings and Employment
Philip C. Sorenson
University of Nebraska College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
Recommended Citation
Philip C. Sorenson, Damages—Loss of Earnings—Measure of Recovery and Admissibility of Evidence of Prior Earnings and Employment,
36 Neb. L. Rev. 605 (1957)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol36/iss4/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

NOTES

Damages-Loss of Earnings-Measure of Recovery and
Admissibility of Evidence of Prior Earnings and
Employment
Plantiff worked continuously as a welder from 1925 through
1950 when he quit welding and went into a business from which
he was never able to realize a substantial income. In 1953, plaintiff,
age 49 and in good health, was permanently and totally disabled
in an auto accident. In his action for damages, evidence was admitted to show the prevailing wages paid to welders in plaintiff's
community as well as plaintiff's own earnings as a welder prior
to 1951. A substantial part of these earnings was derived from
employment outside of the community. On appeal, Held: admissibility of such evidence is in the sound discretion of the trial
court and no abuse of discretion was shown. The precise basis
upon which the court deemed this evidence to be relevant, however, is unclear. The opinion can be read as sanctioning its use
by the jury for the purpose of making either one of two quite
different determinations, viz., (1) in fixing the level of plaintiff's
"future earnings . . . but for the injury;" or (2) in computing the
amount recoverable for "permanent impairment or loss of earning capacity." At no point does the opinion recognize any distinction between the two determinations.'
I. MEASURE OF RECOVERY
While it is usual to state that an injured plaintiff is entitled
to be placed in the same position he would have occupied but for
defendant's wrong,2 judicial and other authoritative discussion
is divided and obscure with regard to the application of this general principle in measuring damages for plaintiff's impaired ability
to work. Several theories have been employed for this purpose,
chief among them the "loss of earnings" theory which grants recovery for the actual reduction of plaintiff's probable earnings
due to the injury.3 A second theory, "impairment of earning capa'Jacobsen v. Poland, 163 Neb. 590, 80 N.W.2d 891 (1957).
2 Navigazione Libera T.S.A. v. Newton Creek Towing Co., 98 F.2d 694
(2d Cir. 1938).

3 Clawson v. Walgreen Drug Co., 108 Utah 577, 162 P.2d 759 (1945).
Imputed earnings, the non-compensable toil of the plaintiff for himself
or his family to which is attributed a pecuniary value, has always been

considered a separate element of damages, though logically it falls
into the same category as loss of earnings for the impaired ability to work.
On imputed earnings, see Marshall v. Smith, 131 Cal. App. 258, 21 P.2d 117
(1933); Kline v. Santa Barbara Consol. Ry., 150 Cal. 741, 90 Pac. 125 (1907).
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city," on the other hand, allows recovery for the impairment of
plaintiff's abstract capacity to earn,4 while still a third, less frequently applied, assesses damages for plaintiff's "loss of time."5
Aside from this and adding to the overall confusion are the cases
allowing recovery for inability to pursue one's chosen vocation,
even where no actual or potential impairment of earning capacity
or loss of earnings is involved. 6
Due to the varying scope of the above theories as tested in
their application, to their use interchangeably and to the misleading
inplications of their terms, no settled rule for assessing damages for
plaintiff's impaired ability to work has been established. Indeed,
some courts expressly refuse to recognize any distinction between
the various theories. 7 More frequently, however, the question is
simply ignored and the theories are employed interchangeably,
as in the instant case.8 Further difficulties arise from the distinction sometimes taken between the applicable measure of recovery for plaintiff's loss before and after the trial. The Restatement, for example, asserts that impairment of earning capacity is the measure of recovery for plaintiff's loss prior to trial
whereas damages arising subsequent to the trial are to be figured
according to plaintiff's actual loss of earnings. 9 McCormick, in his
famous treatise on damages, likewise draws a pre- vs. post-trial
distinction, though the result thereof is the converse of the
one arrived at by the Restatement, viz., that the pre-trial measure
is actual loss of earnings while post-trial damages are assessed
on an impairment of earning capacity basis.' 0 The inconsistency
Clawson v. Walgreen Drug, 108 Utah 577, 162 P.2d 759 (1945).
Muskogee Electric Traction Co. v. Reed, 35 Okla. 334, 130 Pac. 157
(1913). Loss of time will not be considered further as a distinct theory in
that, as applied, it parallels loss of earnings as a measure.
6Mullery v. Great Northern Ry., 50 Mont. 408, 148 Pac. 323 (1915).
7 "'Juries are not particularly concerned over or greatly influenced by
abstract statements.' It is not at all probable, in fact most unlikely, that
the jury would draw a distinction as fine spun as the distinction sought
[between earning capacity and loss of earnings]." Fredhom v. Smith, 193
Minn. 569, 574, 259 N.W. 80, 82 (1935).
8 Such seems to be the case generally in Nebraska. See Jensen v. Omaha
& C.B. St. Ry., 127 Neb. 599, 256 N.W. 65 (1934) (loss of earnings); Yost
v. Nelson, 124 Neb. 33, 245 N.W. 9 (1932) (earning capacity); Malko v.
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 99 Neb. 158, 155 N.W. 876 (1915) (earning capacity).
9
Restatement, Torts §§ 906, 924 (1939). See also Dyer v. Keith, 136
Kan. 216, 14 P.2d 644 (1932); Iseman v. Hayes, 242 Ky. 302, 46 S.W.2d
110, 85 A.L.R. 996 (1932); Houston City St. Ry. v. Richart, 87 Tex. 539, 29
S.W. 1040 (1895).
' 0 McCormick, Damages §§ 86, 87 (1935).
4

5
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in the result obtained by the Restatement and McCormick discloses
the fallacy of the distinction. The fact is that it has no sound basis.
The assumption underlying the foregoing discussion, of course,
is that the courts' choice of one measure of recovery over the
other will often have important practical effects. This is so first
of all because of the varying implications of the terms used in
the different measures. If, for example, plaintiff is unemployed
at the time of the accident, an impairment of earning capacity
standard would seem to afford recovery whereas a loss of earnings theory would not. Also, if plaintiff is earning wages in excess
of the reasonable market value of his services when injured, most
juries would probably be more willing to grant recovery for the
excess over market under a loss of earnings as distinguished from
an impairment of earning capacity standard. Again, the effect of
choosing one theory over the other may have significance in determining the admissibility of evidence bearing upon the amount
of the loss. Evidence of plaintiff's earnings in vocations other than
the one in which he was engaged at the time of the accident, for
example, has much greater apparent relevance under impairment
of earning capacity than under loss of earnings.
It may be helpful at this point briefly to examine the application of the two basic damage measures to representative fact situations in order to illustrate more concretely the practical differences between them:
A. Plaintiff who earns more at his employment than the reasonable
1
market value of his services, e.g., nepotism."
Recovery for loss of earnings will provide recovery for these added
wages, qualified by the probabilities of the length of time plaintiff
would retain such a position. Recovery for impairment of earning
capacity, on the other hand, will provide only an amount equalling
the market value of plaintiff's services, an amount falling short of
his actual loss, unless, of course, the concept of earning capacity
is defined as that sum which plaintiff in fact receives from his
employment.
B. Plaintiff who, because of ignorance or lack of industry or for
personalreasons, makes less at his employment than he could earn
elsewhere, e.g., a professional woman who abandons her career
in order to spend more time with her husband and children.2
"McKenna v. Citizens' Natural Gas Co., 201 Pa. 146, 50 Atl. 922 (1902).
12 The issue of damages accruing from a housewife's impaired ability to
work is especially confused due to her varying rights, e.g. her standing to
sue, her non-pecuniary work in the home, and her chances of resuming a career. Recovery under loss of earnings should be based on the probabilities
of her resuming outside work. See Rodgers v. Boynton, 315 Mass. 279, 52
N.E.2d 576 (1943); Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 Col. L. Rev.
651 (1930).
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Loss of earnings as a measure naturally implies consideration of
such factors in estimating what plaintiff would probably have earned
but for the injury. In contrast, impairment of earning capacity will
provide the same amount only if it is pointed out to the jury that lack
of industry, desire, opportunity, etc., are factors which lessen the
capacity to earn. The impairment of earning capacity terminology,
it will be noted, is extremely misleading in this situation.
C. Plaintiff who earns the fair market value of his services at the
time of the accident but whose chances of an early retirement are
enhanced due to the nature of his employment, other sources of
income, etc., e.g., a ball player or a doctor with a large income
3
from capital investments, as in a famous English case.'
Loss of earnings impliedly asserts the necessity of determining the period during which plaintiff would probably have continued his employment and factors pointing to an early retirement would reduce the
amount of damages awarded. Recovery for impairment of earning
capacity, on the other hand, is misleading as to the importance of
these factors, especially as the terminology of the measure implies
an immediate and complete loss rather than one extending into
the future.
D. Plaintiff who is unemployed at the time of the injury, either
voluntarily and as a usual course, as in the case of a retired worker,
14
or involuntarily, because of scarcity of available employment.
While loss of earnings as a measure by definition gives plaintiff no more
than his actual loss, earning capacity as a measure will sometimes lead
the jury to compensate him for services he never intended to perform
or which he was or would be unable to perform.
E. Plaintiff who is on vacation, either paid or unpaid, at the time
of the injury.15
Viewing a paid vacation as a continuance of the job (in that plaintiff's
wages while working are less by the amount of his vacation pay),
plaintiff would be entitled to his full wages. Both impairment of
earning capacity and loss of earnings would clearly permit such recovery. If, however, the vacation was unpaid, use of earning capacity
as a measure would at times result in over-compensation, just as in
the case of the voluntarily unemployed.
Assuming that our object is to put plaintiff in the position he
would have occupied but for defendant's wrong, it should be apparent from the above analysis that loss of earnings as a measure
is far preferable to impairment of earning capacity, unless the
latter measure is so broadly interpreted as to convert it into a
loss of earnings measure, though still there remains the mis-

13 Phillips v. The London & S.W. Ry. Co., 5 Q. B. D. 78 (1879).
14 Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. v. Perkins, 205 Ky. 798, 266 S.W. 652 (1924).
15 See Restatement, Torts § 906, Comment b (1939).
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leading terminology. Except in the instance where plaintiff
has been over-paid for his services, earning capacity as a measure
erroneously tends to over-compensate the plaintiff for his loss.
This does not mean that there should be no compensation in cases
where no actual loss of outside earnings can be shown, or for the
losses other than wages arising from the impaired ability to work.
Such losses should be considered separate elements by themselves
or falling under separate categories, e.g., mental suffering. For
example, in the case where plaintiff is on an unpaid vacation
at the time of the injury, he should be entitled to some compensation for interference with his unpaid vacation, but it makes no
sense to compensate him for the market value of services he never
intended to perform. The sum awarded for the lost vacation should
depend solely on the degree to which plaintiff suffered by reason
16
of such loss.
Reference is sometimes made to the jurys' possible failure to
apply the courts' instructions as given, but this is no excuse for not
making these instructions as rational and intelligible as possible.
Clarification of the measure of recovery for the impaired ability
to work would be a step in correcting a situation not atypical in the
17
law of damages.
II. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF PRIOR EARNINGS

AND EMPLOYMENT
As we have seen, the court did not make it clear whether the
admissibility of plaintiff's prior earnings as a welder depended in
any manner upon a choice between impairment of earnings capacity and loss of earnings. Regardless of the inter-dependence of
these two issues, however, the court's ruling that the admission
16 "In personal injury actions unless there is shown to be a diminished
earning capacity measured in terms of dollars and cents flowing from
such injuries there can be no recovery based upon this particular element of damages." Phoenix v. Mubarek All Khan, 72 Ariz. 1, 229 P.2d
949, 953 (1951). (Emphasis added.) In this case plaintiff had held important positions on a charitable basis, e.g., President of the Indian
Welfare League, personal representative of Mahatma Gandhi, lobbyist for
repeal of the Indian Exclusion Act, but was not permitted any recovery
for impairment of earning capacity.
17 ,..
[Tlhe crucial controversy in personal injury torts today is not
in the area of liability but of damages. ... Questions of damages-and
particularly their magnitude-do not lend themselves so easily to discourse... Judges consign them uneasily to juries with a minimum of
guidance, occasionally observing loosely that there are no rules for assessing damages in personal injury cases." Jaffe, Damages for Personal
Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 Law & Contemp. Prob. 219, 221 (1953).
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of such evidence was not an abuse of discretion deserves independent consideration.
Recognizing that dollars-and-cents precision in assessing personal injury damages is impossible, the courts have not, once the
fact of some damage has been established, normally required any
greater certainty as to the amount than the nature of the problem
of proof admits.' 8 All facts and circumstances tending to show
the probable amount are proper and there is no fixed rule as to
subject-matter in such inquiries. 9 In determining loss of earnings,
the nature of plaintiff's prior employment and his earnings therefrom have often been considered, 20 together, of course, with such factors as plaintiff's age, health, character and training. 21 So far as
plaintiff's prior employment and earnings are concerned, there
is virtual uniformity that such evidence is admissible provided only
that it refers to a time period reasonably related to the time of
injury22and is not rendered inadmissible due to some independent
factor.

However, the courts have differed in determining the length

of the "reasonable" and permissible time gap. 23 Of course, as pre-

viously mentioned, admissibility of prior earnings and employment will sometimes depend on factors independent of remoteness
of time, such as apparent abandonment of a prior occupation, 24 a
'8 Alabama Great Southern R.R. v. McWhorter, 156 Ala. 269, 47 So. 84
(1908); Yost v. Nelson, 124 Neb. 33, 245 N.W. 9 (1932); Franklin Motor Car

Co. v. Dyer, 29 Ohio App. 241, 163 N.E. 568 (1928).
19 Wells Fargo & Co. v. Benjamin, 165 S.W. 120 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
20
Abraham v. Gendlin, 172 F.2d 881 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Pawlicki v.
Detroit United Ry., 191 Mich. 536, 158 N.W. 162 (1916); Yost v. Nelson, 124
Neb. 33, 245 N.W. 9 (1932); Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Harling, 260 S.W.
1016 (Tex. 1924); Annot., 130 A.L.R. 164 (1941); McCormick, Damages § 86

n.3 (1935); Sutherland, Damages §§ 1246, 1248 (4th ed. 1916).
21 Qakes v. Maine C. R.R., 95 Me. 103, 49 Atl. 418 (1901).
22See note 20 supra.
23
Admissible, Pawlicki v. Detroit United Ry., 191 Mich. 536, 158 N.W.
162 (1916) (6 mos.); Galveston, H. & S.A. R.R. v. Harling, 260 S.W. 1016
(Tex. 1924) (2 yrs.); Franklin Motor Car Co. v. Dyer, 29 Ohio App. 241, 163
N.E. 568 (1928) (5 yrs.); Oakes v. Maine C. R.R., 95 Me. 103, 49 Atl. 418

(1901)

(11 yrs.); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Benjamin, 165 S.W. 120 (Tex. Civ.

App. 1914) (20 yrs. in same employ). Inadmissible,Hamman v. Central Coal
& Coke Co., 156 Mo. 232, 56 S.W. 1091 (1900) (1 yr.); Rooney v. Maczko, 315
Pa. 113, 172 Atl. 151 (1934) (4 yrs.); Fox v. Asheville Army Store, Inc., 216

N.C. 468, 5 S.E.2d 436 (1939)

145 (1940) (9 yrs.).
24

(6 yrs.); Wiley v. Moyer, 339 Pa. 405, 15 A.2d

Houston & T.C. R.R. v. Gee, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 414, 66 S.W. 78(1901).
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previous job for some special and limited occasion, 25 and the probabilities of securing such previous employment in the future if
resumption is desired. 26 Nevertheless, time is almost always the
most important single factor in the balance and on many occasions
has of itself been decisive.
Nebraska seems to have adopted the better and more liberal
interpretation of reasonable time in the instant case by admitting
evidence of prior employment and earnings, even though the facts
tended to show a possible abandonment of plaintiff's trade three
years prior to the injury. The liberality of the court's ruling is
further highlighted by the fact that a portion of plaintiff's prior
earnings was derived from employment outside of the community,
overruling a prior Nebraska case, 27 as well as by the court's favorable references to cases outside of Nebraska which sanction a broad
field of admissibility.
The court's position seems well-founded. A broad area of admissibility of earnings from previous employment seems almost a
necessary concomitant to the intelligent determination of the
amount plaintiff would have earned but for the injury. Prediction
necessitates an inquiry into the past. Indeed, plaintiff's earnings
prior to the injury are almost always a proper consideration in
fixing the amount of the loss. Remoteness of time does not imply
remoteness to the problem. Prior earnings and employment are
highly relevant subjects of inquiry. The extent to which these
earnings will afford a basis for predicting plaintiff's future loss is
one of proof, or weight of the material.2 This is a question for
the jury, except, of course, where the evidence has only an insignificant probative value in relation to the time required to present
it, or the possible prejudicial effect on the jury outweighs its relevance.
In summary, and subject to the foregoing qualifications, all
evidence of prior employment and earnings should be admitted
for consideration by the jury. Such evidence will often provide
a definite wage-earning pattern which may then be projected into
the future and will at the least furnish a broader basis for the
decision of an inherently difficult jury problem.
Philip C. Sorensen, '59
25 Carlile v. Bentley, 81 Neb. 715, 116 N.W. 772 (1908).
26
Frysinger v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 249 Pa. 555, 95 Atl. 257
(1915).
27
Hershiser v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 102 Neb. 820, 170 N.W. 177 (1918).
2
8Germ v. San Francisco, 99 Cal. App.2d 404, 222 P.2d 122 (1950). See
Wigmore, Evidence § 29 (3d ed. 1940).

